What do we know about Mali's recent coup?

 

Malian Air Force deputy chief of staff Ismael Wague (centre) speaks during a press conference on August 19, 2020. ANNIE RISEMBERG/AFP via Getty Images

Bruce Whitehouse, Lehigh University

Soldiers have ousted Mali’s President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta who has now resigned, alongside the country’s prime minister. Moina Spooner from The Conversation Africa asked Bruce Whitehouse, who has carried out studies on coups and violent extremism in Mali, to share his thoughts on what brought on this coup, and what needs to happen next to ensure stability in the country.

What laid the ground for the recent coup in Mali and who led it?

There are many long-term factors, but the immediate reason for the coup was Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta’s dismal performance as president. When first elected to the office in 2013, Keita had the ideal resume, having held nearly every top post in the Malian government (foreign minister, prime minister, speaker of the National Assembly). Yet he subsequently did not address the existential threats to Mali’s people and the state, from political violence to corruption.

His 2013 campaign promise to root out corruption and restore the country’s dilapidated sovereignty quickly proved hollow. Scandals over his acquisition of a new presidential jet and shady defence contracts gave the impression that his administration would be no more transparent or upright than those that came before.

Insecurity was already severe in Mali’s northern regions when Keïta took office, mainly due to jihadi militants and criminal gangs. In the subsequent seven years the situation steadily worsened as roadside bombings and raids on government targets (including military and police posts, prisons, and administrative buildings) spread to other parts of the country. Many troops have been killed by militants, and soldiers lacked the supplies and vehicles they needed to carry on the fight.

The violence resulted in a major humanitarian crisis. By the end of 2019, the UN estimated that 3.9 million people were in need of assistance and protection – an increase of 700 000 since the beginning of the year.

So ordinary Malians, and military personnel alike, were frustrated with Keïta’s government. As a consequence, since June there were persistent and massive street protests in Bamako, the capital, demanding Keïta’s resignation.

We don’t yet know much about the officers who led the coup. They call themselves the National Committee for the Salvation of the People and appear to be more highly ranked (colonels and possibly a general) than the officers who led previous coups in Mali. Colonel Assimi Goita has announced himself as the new leader.

This is not the first time Mali’s had a coup. The most recent one was in 2012 and, like this one, resulted in military control. How would you rate the transition to a civilian government after the 2012 coup?

In many ways, the 2020 coup resembles its 2012 predecessor. Both began as mutinies in Mali’s largest army base in Kati, on the outskirts of Bamako. The international response to both coups has been similar: statements of condemnation and promises of sanctions by the West African regional body, ECOWAS. And both seemed to garner quick popular support. A poll conducted after the 2012 coup showed that about two-thirds of Bamako residents backed the junta. The mass protests leading to this coup indicates that many Malians also support change.

One big difference is that the 2020 junta had President Keïta and his prime minister arrested on the first day and the president announced his resignation soon after on television. By contrast, the 2012 junta never managed to capture the president they ousted (Amadou Toumani Touré), leaving the coup’s outcome uncertain for several days.

Though the transition to civilian rule in 2012 appeared to happen relatively quickly - it took about a month for ECOWAS to negotiate a handover to an interim civilian government - it masked continued interference from the military who retained considerable power behind the scenes for many months. For instance, just a few weeks after the coup, the military orchestrated a mob attack that sent the interim president abroad for medical treatment.

This situation endured until 2013, when the French military intervention against jihadi militants began. From my own analysis, the presence of French troops discouraged the Malian military from meddling too openly with politics.

In August 2013, President Keita was voted in as president and, until now, seemed to have been able to keep the military in check, but military officers leading the coup appear to have been emboldened by the street protests of the past two months.

How should the transition to a civilian government this time around be handled to ensure political stability in the country?

The transition to a civilian government won’t be smooth.

There is significant public distrust in Bamako toward politicians. Under Mali’s 1992 constitution, the speaker of the National Assembly is supposed to become interim president and organise new elections after a president’s resignation, but President Keïta dissolved the body prior to resigning. This leaves no obvious successor.

The constitution also calls for new elections to be organised within a very short period - just 40 days - after the establishment of an interim government. Meeting this deadline proved impossible in 2012 for Mali, a poor country torn apart by conflict, and would be equally impossible in 2020.

This leaves the path forward uncertain and requiring negotiation between the junta, Malian civil society groups and political parties, foreign governments, and international bodies.

What are the likely regional implications, if any, of this coup?

West African governments don’t like to see a president, particularly an elected one, toppled from power by his own military. ECOWAS will continue issuing strong statements and talking about sanctions. This is also because heads of state throughout the region don’t want their own military officers getting any ideas about emulating what happened in Mali.

Yet we saw in 2012 that ECOWAS had neither the will nor perhaps even the capacity to isolate Mali economically. I don’t expect that has changed, but the stakes are different this time: the Sahel is a much more dangerous place in 2020 than it was eight years ago. I would expect France and the UN, which have thousands of troops in the country, to be the real drivers of an international response to this coup.

Bruce Whitehouse, Associate Professor, Lehigh University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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How to Address Youth Violence in The Niger-Delta

Young people’s lives in Niger Delta have not improved despite the setting up of development agencies Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP via Getty Images

Modesta Tochi Alozie, University of Sheffield

Twenty years ago, local resistance arose in the Niger Delta because of the way oil revenue was being shared and how oil pollution was undermining local livelihoods.

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Why Terrorism Continues in Nigeria

Anadolu Agency/Getty Images

Sheriff Folarin, Covenant University

For ten years, the Nigerian authorities have engaged the terror group Boko Haram in the northeast without making much headway. After what appeared to be some success in 2015 and 2016, there was a resurgence of Boko Haram violence in 2017.

This worsened with the emergence of Islamic State in West Africa and, in more recent times, banditry and kidnap gangs all over the northern Nigeria region.

Having studied this crisis over the years as a political scientist, my view is that it is rooted in ethnic, religious and partisan politics and corruption. National security springs from mutual respect, peaceful co-existence and equality of social groups. But as argued in a paper I co-authored, the affiliation of Nigerian leaders to identity groups poses a challenge to national security.

We conclude that the government must show the will to fight the terrorists and eschew nepotism and ethnic or religious sentiments in the war. It must also deal decisively with corruption.

Additionally, we underscore that neither Boko Haram or Islamic State in West Africa is Nigerian or Muslim. No responsible or patriotic leader should see it as such. Nigeria should be unified in the struggle and united against terrorism. This is how to beat it into a permanent retreat.

Ebbs and flows

Religious fundamentalism has long been a feature of social existence and relations in northern Nigeria. But religion-inspired terrorism emerged from 2009 after the murder by security forces in Maiduguri of the Boko Haram leader, Muhammed Yusuf, and hundreds of his followers. What started as targeting some members of the political elite in Borno by Boko Haram soon turned into organised bombings of public places.

Despite involvement of the military, foreign partners and counter-terrorism measures from 2011 to 2015, the government seemed unable to get a grip of the situation. Boko Haram grew stronger, expanded its operations and declared an Islamic Caliphate.

By 2015, over 10,000 people had been killed and about 3 million internally displaced. Hundreds of thousands had to flee into neighbouring countries.

The emergence of a former military ruler as president in 2015 created the expectation that the terror group could be brought under control. Instead, the Islamic State’s West African Province also emerged – a breakaway faction of Boko Haram. Violence escalated and spread.

There were some successes in rolling back the expansion of Boko Haram. Between mid-2015 and late 2016, the federal government moved the terror and counter-terror “situation room” to Maiduguri, the heart of the crisis. The military halted the expansion of the “Caliphate” and took back the 14 local governments seized by the terror group. Flights and normal business returned to most parts of the northeast. Attacks stopped and the military could claim that Boko Haram had been technically defeated.

But then, just when it seemed the menace of Boko Haram had been ended by sheer military force, the federal government suggested dialogue and ransoms. Aggression and violence returned in Northern Nigeria and still hasn’t been completely controlled.

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Read more: How Boko Haram has evolved over the past ten years

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One school of thought argues that the will and dynamic approach in the fight against Boko Haram were short-lived, which wasted the success achieved in two years. When the government sought dialogue and negotiation and paid ransoms, it re-energised the terror group.

Another view is that the current administration was weakened when it began considering amnesty for repentant members of the group and swapping their prisoners for release of innocent Nigerian and foreign captives.

Yet another view is that the group’s breakup into factions fueled internal competition, with the groups’ targets on the receiving end.

For me, two theories explain the protracted crisis. They also amplify the other perspectives.

Factors at play

First is that there are people in government who lack the will to fight because of religious and ethnic affiliations or connections. Some in government consider Boko Haram members as northerners or Muslims who should therefore be dealt with cautiously.

Some military leaders have been accused of nepotism and of giving away vital details to compromise the onslaught against the terror gangs. The Borno State governor recently accused the military of sabotage in an attack on his convoy.

The second explanation is corruption. Since 2014, some senior soldiers and their civilian counterparts directing the war have come to see the war budget as an endless means to draw money for personal enrichment. There are examples of counter-terrorism or so-called counter-insurgency funds stolen by the national security adviser and dozens of others as well as some isolated cases of stolen war money by some security or service chiefs. While some opted for plea bargains, others are still undergoing trial.

The recent rise in banditry and demonstrations against it show that the people can no longer accept the circumstances. Boko Haram, Islamic State, bandits and kidnap gangs are threats to Nigeria’s peace, stability, security and economic prosperity. Everyone wants a stop to it. What do we do?

How to break the vicious circle

Government has the responsibility to provide genuine leadership in the war. The statement credited recently to the army chief that the crisis can only be stopped by Nigerians, thus passing the buck to civilians, is irresponsible. It’s only the armed forces that have the arsenals and training to fight Boko Haram and other such groups.

Corruption must be fought and conquered. The Borno governor once accused soldiers of extorting money from motorists where Boko Haram has a strong presence. Such practices – as well as instances of compromised military intelligence – are a big problem the military high command must stop by itself.

Dialogue, negotiation, ransom payments, amnesty and integration of repentant insurgents into the army and society are not the solution. They will only serve as the internal seeds of destruction of the army and its efforts against terrorism.

And, in my view, any attempt to integrate “repentant” terrorists in the army will expose the military and security architecture to intelligence and operational compromises.

Sheriff Folarin, Professor of International Relations, Covenant University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Football and politics: when Algeria won the 2019 Africa Cup of Nations

ISLAM SAFWAT/NurPhoto/Getty Images

Mahfoud Amara, Qatar University

With African football on hold and the Africa Cup of Nations (Afcon) rescheduled because of the COVID-19 pandemic, there’s plenty of nostalgia to go around. But memories of the Algeria’s biggest football wins can offer more than just nostalgia. The 2019 Afcon win in Egypt also offers insights into how governments co-opt the game.

Algeria’s victory against West Germany in the 1982 FIFA World Cup, still in Algeria’s post-independence, was an iconic moment. As was their first Afcon win in 1990 in Algiers.

A decade later the country entered one of its darkest times since independence. Under Abdelaziz Bouteflika – who would serve as president for 20 years from 1999. Political violence caused the deaths of thousands and deeply affected Algerian society.

The 2019 Afcon trophy would be lifted 29 years after the first. This game, in Egypt, is especially worth recalling because of the political circumstances surrounding it. All the elements of a Greek tragedy were in place that day.

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Read more: Bouteflika steps aside as Algerians push to reclaim and own their history

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On the streets

On Friday 22 February 2019, after a campaign on social media following the announcement by the ruling National Liberation Front that an ailing Bouteflika would stand for a fifth term, hundred of thousands of demonstrators took to the street to express their discontent. The prospect of enduring another five years of Bouteflikism was too dire.

Since then, every Tuesday for students, and every Friday after the prayer, Algerians of all ages and regions have returned to the streets. The peaceful protesters want real change, including the end of the army-backed establishment that has ruled since independence in 1962. On March 8, Women’s Day, the number of demonstrators, men and women of different age and class in the hirak (the Arabic word for “movement”), reached an unprecedented level.

The army, led by General Major Gaïd Salah, Minister of Defense, pushed for Bouteflika’s resignation and the postponement of the election. This led to the disintegration of Bouteflika’s high profile entourage, called the essaba (gang), who accumulated colossal fortunes in exchange for financially backing political manoeuvres to maintain Bouteflika’s regime.

Demonstrators in Algiers in October 2019. Mustafa Hassona/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images

In the stadia

This money was also used to co-opt sport, football in particular. Each election, photos of Bouteflika would adorn football stadia and be displayed at the opening of matches. It was not unusual for club bosses and former players to be seen at political rallies for Bouteflika, who famously claimed during a 2009 speech that Algeria “has the means to organise two football World Cups”.

One example of this interplay between football, business and politics is a long-time backer of Bouteflika, construction magnate Ali Haddad, who purchased the football club USM Alger in 2010 and became its president. Interestingly, the club’s fans continued with their chanting attacks on the symbols of Bouteflika’s privileged class or “les nouveaux riches” who controlled the networks of politics, media and business in Algeria.

Football fans have been active in the hirak from the beginning, and their politicised football chants have been embraced as an expression of popular resentment with political systems and socio-economic conditions.

Following on the heels of Bouteflika’s resignation amid massive protests and the nomination of a caretaker president, the 2019 Africa Cup of Nations came in the right time. It was for the new decision makers, led by General Salah, an opportunity to reconcile with the population and rebrand the new ruling elite as guarantors of stability and the fight against corruption.

For the Algerian national football team, after years of instability and management changes, it was another opportunity to reconcile with supporters at home and among the large Algerian diaspora in Europe and in North America.

On the Afcon field

In 2014, Algeria experienced its first time in a knockout round at the FIFA World Cup. But when Djamel Belmadi was appointed as new coach in August 2018, the team had plunged into a crisis of confidence. Results were absent and critics were present and acerbic. So when Belmadi announced that Algeria would go to Egypt to lift the cup, few took him seriously.

The tournament was being played in Egypt, one of the favourites for the title. For Algeria, Egypt was a rather hostile sporting environment. The two countries had been football foes for decades – and at political loggerheads over the Libyan conflict – and the animosity was tangible. The hostility continued especially after Egypt failed to reach the second qualifying round. Yet opposition to Algeria’s opponents in the final, Senegal, was also great.

With the logistic support of the army, the new Algerian leadership organised the airlifting of Algerian supporters from different regions of the country into Egypt, even offering them free tickets once in Cairo.

In the stadium Algerian fans cheered a team that was “reborn alongside the hirak”.

Back on the streets

And so the celebrations of Algeria’s second Afcon cup happened in a unique context. They extended to the Algerian community around the world, in Europe, Canada and the US, and in France in particular.

Algeria’s supporters in France celebrate after Algeria beat Senegal 1-0 in the final. Estelle Ruiz/NurPhoto/Getty Images

And, as always, raising the Algerian flag in French cities fuelled the debate on French identity and the question of alliance with Algeria’s former colonisers.

Algeria’s captain Ryad Mahrez, after scoring a winning free kick against Nigeria to qualify for the final, had tweeted “the free kick was for you, we are together” with Algerian and French flag emojis. There were a number of French-Algerian dual nationals on the team.

The tweet was in response to a far-right tweet “to avoid the tide of Algerian flags, to preserve our national holiday … Trust the 11 Nigerian players.”

You could also read how around 2,500 police officers had been mobilised in Paris to “prevent street clashes”. The situation led French-Algerian coach Belmadi to urge Algerian supporters in France to celebrate in an “orderly” way – a reference to the peaceful and orderly hirak protests.

A number of supporters were nonetheless arrested after clashes with police.

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Read more: Why, after one year, protests continue to rock Algeria

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Looking back, the 2019 Afcon win underscores how the Algerian regime has long understood how to mobilise the national football team victories for its own agenda. But the regime is also now very aware of the liberty football can bring.

For years young Algerians have understood that stadiums are the ideal venue to freely voice their socio-political and economic discontent. These football chants and slogans reached their zenith when they were eventually repeated by thousands every Friday during hirak marches.

Abdelkader Abderrahmane contributed to this article. He is a geopolitical researcher and international consultant on African peace and security issues.

Mahfoud Amara, Associate Professor in Sport Policy & Management, Qatar University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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